

Countering disinformation and misinformation in animal health emergencies



World Organisation
for Animal Health




Emergency Management

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1. Introduction

Veterinary Services and Aquatic Animal Health Services safeguard the health and welfare of animals and those who care for them, as well as the safety of animal products and the people who consume them. These Services look out for animal health symptoms and risks, and recommend actions to contain, control or eliminate threats.

Today, Veterinary Services and Aquatic Animal Health Services face **new and emerging threats: disinformation and misinformation**. Misinformation is inaccurate information, usually spread without harmful intent. Disinformation is inaccurate or misleading information, deliberately created and spread to cause harm to target governments, organisations or people.

If no action is taken, the consequences can be significant, threatening lives and livelihoods, undermining trust, and taking up resources. Misinformation and disinformation can spread rapidly, causing confusion and hampering emergency control and response measures. They increase the risk that animal and zoonotic diseases or other health threats will spread and cause economic and social damage.

These threats are not just directed at Veterinary Services and Aquatic Animal Health Services. Disinformation actions in particular can be criminal in nature or enable/support criminal or terrorist activities, and therefore concern Law Enforcement agencies.

Disinformation and misinformation became particularly visible during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, international agencies, governments, scientists, the media, civil society groups and concerned citizens are taking action to pinpoint the challenges, as well as to guide



BOX 1: MISINFORMATION ABOUT A VIRAL DISEASE OF CATTLE THREATENS THE LIVELIHOODS OF DAIRY FARMERS IN INDIA

A BBC 'fake news' story from October 2022 explains how social media misinformation about the spread and treatment of lumpy skin disease is stirring up conspiracy theories, undermining cattle vaccination efforts and suggesting that milk is not safe to drink.

The story debunks the misinformation with science, facts and the voices of experts.

Source: BBC, 2022 [2]

organisations and individuals on how to prevent and tackle these issues.

To orient Veterinary Services, Aquatic Animal Health Services and Law Enforcement to these issues and introduce some key strategies to manage disinformation and misinformation, these guidelines have been prepared by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and the International

Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL). They draw from a June 2022 virtual workshop convened as part of the WOAH, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and INTERPOL Project on '[building resilience against agro-crime and agro-terrorism](#)', which was funded by Global Affairs Canada's Weapons Threat Reduction Program [1].

The guidelines provide a starting point for these services and agencies, as well as organisations working in animal health emergencies, to **prepare for, detect and respond to** disinformation and misinformation. Since this is a fast-moving area with much information and guidance already available, this document includes links to [further resources](#) that offer more detail on specific strategies and actions.

2. Key concepts

2.1. Definitions

Disinformation is false, deceptive, misleading or manipulated information deliberately created, presented and disseminated with the intent to deceive, mislead or cause harm. It is mainly created and spread by people wanting to advance specific agendas or distort public opinion; secondary spreaders may not be aware of its criminal or harmful effects.

Misinformation is false, deceptive, misleading or manipulated information not disseminated with the intention to deceive. It is often spread by people who do not realise it is false and do not intend to cause harm.


Other relevant notions that are not explicitly addressed in these guidelines are **malinformation** – genuine information that is exaggerated, shared or leaked with the objective to mislead or cause harm – and **propaganda**, false or biased information spread to achieve political/ideological goals.

A widely used term in the health sector is **infodemic** – defined by the World Health Organization as an ‘overflow of information of varying quality that surges across digital and physical environments during an acute public health event’ [3,4].

2.2. Motivations for spreading disinformation and misinformation

There are many reasons why people are motivated to share disinformation and misinformation.

Some may be ‘fooled’ or convinced they are doing a service to friends and others. Some may spread ‘viral’ messages, memes or images out of a sense of mischief or humour. Others, perhaps inhabiting alternate information ‘bubbles’, are predisposed to mistrust established science or voices, and they share incorrect information that matches their values and world view.






In these cases, the primary concern is with misinformation, mostly spread by the sharers without malice or full understanding of the potentially harmful effects. It is important to note that there are differences in how susceptible various social groups and demographics are to mis- and disinformation, thus impacting the extent to and speed at which they spread.

Creators – and to some extent sharers – of disinformation are more likely to have illegal or criminal motives, in which they seek financial, political or other benefits from spreading fake information. They may wish to persuade and manipulate others to take positions or undertake actions, often without those individuals being aware that they are inadvertently spreading harmful information that benefits others.

The spread of disinformation and misinformation is facilitated by two features of today's digital world:

- First, individuals tend to inhabit digital 'echo chambers' and 'filter bubbles' where exposure to information is mediated by the networks and algorithms that are curated for people [5-7]. These effects may not be easily apparent, as individuals often have limited digital 'literacy' and awareness of the disinformation threats they are exposed to. Just as individuals interact in such online chambers and bubbles, organisations tend to interact and communicate in their known spaces with well-known audiences, so they can miss critical debates or lack abilities to intervene beyond their normal channels.



- Second, there are now various ways in which individual and organisational influencers create, manipulate and 'virally' share finely targeted and compelling messages and images designed to gain attention, including through smart, sophisticated and widely available digital and communication tools which are often widely accessible. The range of possibilities is exemplified through factors such as 'clickbait' (sensationalised headlines linking to often misleading information); 'deepfakes' (digitally altered or manipulated audio, images and video used to misrepresent someone); 'trolls' (people using social media to attack and undermine the credibility of ideas they don't like); and 'bots' (computer programs that automatically disseminate fake news on social media).

BOX 2: MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE SPREAD OF MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION

The 'RESIST 2' Counter Disinformation Toolkit offers a useful typology of motives for spreading disinformation or misinformation.

Sometimes people spread misleading or manipulated information because they genuinely believe something, because they want to persuade others, or because they want it to be true.

- 1. Groups and individuals sometimes use dubious communication tactics because they believe it is the best way for their voices to be heard.**
- 2. Sometimes people use the anonymity of being online to do things they would never do in real life, which can confer status within a hierarchical online community.**
- 3. Often people spread misleading information that is aimed at adversely affecting the credibility, trust and reputation of a target person or organisation.**
- 4. Sometimes the intent is to contribute to existing tensions by aggravating them, thereby eroding the middle ground.**
- 5. Sometimes people spread misleading or manipulated information because they can make money from it.**
- 6. Sometimes non-state actors conduct espionage designed to undermine the prosperity and security of a country.**

Source: British Government Communication Service, 2021 [8]

3. Countering disinformation and misinformation threats

Three key actions, **‘PREPARE – DETECT – RESPOND’**, are used here to introduce some pivotal strategies for Veterinary Services, Aquatic Animal Health Services and Law Enforcement agencies to consider when countering disinformation and misinformation.

3.1. Prepare


Even without detailed intelligence, the potential for mis- or disinformation to cause harm and confusion requires that animal health agencies and their key stakeholders and partners be prepared to take action. Some specific preparatory strategies and actions are provided here.

Raise awareness of the phenomenon and its impacts among Veterinary Services, Aquatic Animal Health Services and Law Enforcement agencies and the people they work with.

Leaders should be educated to take timely action, encouraging cross-agency and cross-border collaboration, and putting in place robust and agile plans, procedures and capacities. An important element in this is for organisations to strengthen their own safeguards against inadvertent dissemination of false or inaccurate information.

Know your audiences and build ‘cognitive resilience’ in people and organisations to prepare for and manage threats. In the same way that animals and people are inoculated or vaccinated against diseases, the misinformation resistance, capacities and literacy of people and organisations can be built up, so they can perceive and recognise threats and take appropriate actions. Disinformation and misinformation preparedness and response can be integrated into contingency plans and standard operating procedures developed to deal with them.

Build trust and connections with stakeholders before a crisis occurs to foster intelligence and readiness to act. Creating relationships during an emergency is too late. It is important to strengthen existing structures and partnerships instead of building parallel structures. Credible information sources should be established that can serve as fact-checkers for stakeholders and the public.



Use training, gaming and exercises to help individuals, organisations and agencies understand and prepare to tackle threats like disinformation and misinformation. For emergencies, such exercises¹ help to evaluate preparedness, identify deficiencies, clarify roles and responsibilities, recommend improvements, improve coordination, and increase awareness and understanding of hazards and their potential impacts [9].

Improve, extend and widen organisational reach on social media, in communities and elsewhere to detect risks and engage different groups for maximum impact. This includes developing links with media and other influencers [10,11] who may more effectively reach people with facts, and strengthening organisations' capacity to understand and act on these threats.

Coordinate monitoring of and actions on disinformation and misinformation across the network of emergency management agencies. This includes Veterinary Services, Aquatic Animal Health Services, Public Health, Law Enforcement and Environmental Health. Specialised skills should be brought in, for example, via communication specialists/public information officers. Disinformation and misinformation are likely to occur even when opposed by prevention and mitigation efforts, but the key is to limit their impact in affecting the overall response effort.

Build organisational feedback loops and learning. This allows groups to adapt, be better prepared for the next emergency, and helps identify best practices for wider use.

BOX 3: SIMULATING MISINFORMATION THREATS


In New Mexico, 'tabletop' exercises (TTX) of the Southwest Border Center for Emergency Preparedness and Food Protection worked through a range of animal disease misinformation scenarios. The aim was to develop and facilitate preparedness efforts across different jurisdictional areas and countries (both Mexico and the United States of America). Lessons learned included the need for trustworthy sources, consistent messaging, and involvement of everyone, not just public information officers.



1. Examples of such exercises can be found here: <https://www.ready.gov/exercises>

3.2. Detect

A critical element of preparation and response is being able to detect and assess the potential risks from disinformation and misinformation events. Just as awareness is crucial in preparation, detection systems start with people and organisations being able to see and understand the threats and the stakes involved.



Recognise the importance of the threats. It is often hard to distinguish whether a message or post is false, misleading, or intended to cause harm and, if so, whether it is a 'one-off' or part of a systematic effort. The RESIST 2 Counter Disinformation Toolkit [8] sets out steps that can help: investigate the messages, unpack the narratives behind them, assess the identities or 'brand' of people spreading the messages, examine the intent or motivations of those spreading the messages, and identify the likely impacts if successful. When detecting threats, the typology of intentions to help understand why a misinformation or disinformation event happens is a useful tool; this is summarised in [Box 2](#) on page 9.

Monitor disinformation and misinformation risks and threats. Devise a framework to help understand, trigger and guide action on risks, by employing [social listening](#) (described on page 13) and other strategies to identify what people are concerned about. The objectives here are to reduce vulnerabilities, plan for risk, and protect priorities for animal health. Any framework should provide early warning in case disinformation or misinformation appears in a priority animal health policy area or among key influencers and audiences. It should help to build a better understanding of digital debates on animal health priorities, the views of key influencers and audiences on animal health issues, how influencers and audiences engage with animal health issues and organisations, and any changes in trends over time. Such a framework should also consider different gender, socio-economic and education differentials, which can shape how and where disinformation and misinformation appear and spread.

BOX 4: EPIDEMIC INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCES

The Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources (EIOS) initiative of public health stakeholders – including WOH – facilitates unified early detection, verification, assessment and communication of public health threats, using publicly available information. This initiative collates hundreds of thousands of articles from online media and social media sources, websites, news aggregators, blogs and expert groups, and runs them through text mining and analytical modules so they can be analysed and acted on.

Source: WHO, 2024 [12]

Turn monitoring into insight. This is a form of analysis that converts interesting data into actionable data. Insight is usually provided through reports, dashboards, alerts or other methods that identify emerging trends, provide early warning of threats, understand how mis- and disinformation spread, recommend actions, and support response interventions.

Beyond monitoring and insight, it is important to assess any **likely impacts** of threats on wider communities, the government and other actors, and understand how these impacts may affect organisational objectives, credibility and reputation, to help set responses and other priorities.

A specific and growing detection approach is **'social listening' to pinpoint concerns, threats and risks** so they can be tackled. Social listening uses online/digital systems and tools to track the mentions of certain words, phrases, or complex queries across social media and the Web, followed by an analysis of the data [13]. Instead of monitoring the behaviour of certain actors, social listening looks for insights into the sentiment, misperceptions, or dominant narratives circulating on social media and other online forums to inform appropriate action [14].

BOX 5: SOCIAL LISTENING DASHBOARD COUNTERS VACCINE MISINFORMATION

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Vaccine Demand Observatory (VDO) dashboard centralises misinformation alerts, fact checks, and media data from both global and community sources. This is used by staff to monitor misinformation and respond to it with evidence-based communication strategies.



Source: VDO, 2022 [15]

BOX 6: RISK COMMUNICATION


Risk analysis is a useful overall approach to organisational capability for building preparedness and 'inoculating' against misinformation. This generally comprises:

1. **Risk Communication** – engaging with communities, dynamic listening and gaining trust;
2. **Risk Assessment** – defining hazards and triggers to act, identifying risk pathways and critical control points for the spread of misinformation/disinformation, and assessing the consequences of the hazard;
3. **Risk Management** – active monitoring and surveillance (tracking and tracing), increasing the sensitivity of the system to detect misinformation/disinformation, increasing the prevalence of true information, and decreasing the prevalence of false information (detecting and removing).



The key to this approach is **message consistency**. Multiple, consistent messages are typically more effective than single messages or inconsistent messages. The accuracy of messages is fundamental, as errors in past warnings have resulted in people failing to respond to subsequent warnings. Messages containing instructions on appropriate or recommended actions must be specific; they need to provide precise details on 'what, when, how, and for how long'. Risk messages and approaches should be tailored for diverse audiences, taking into account the influences of different social, cultural and demographic backgrounds and varying capacities to take action and access resources. Risk communication messages should be (pre-)tested extensively before crisis situations, particularly among at-risk and hard-to-reach communities.

An example of risk communication in animal disease outbreaks and emergencies strategy was developed for the Myanmar Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation [16]



3.3. Respond

The core of an effective response to disinformation and misinformation is communication, reinforced by good preparation, accurate intelligence and analysis, powerful relationships and partnerships (including with community groups), as well as trust and confidence-building activities that reinforce the credibility of facts and evidence.

A good general starting point for public and other agencies is the ten *Principles of Good Practice for Public Communication Responses to Mis- and Disinformation* by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [17], summarised in Box 7 below.



BOX 7: GOOD PRACTICE FOR PUBLIC COMMUNICATION ON MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION

- 1. Transparency:** Communicate in an honest, clear and open manner, comprehensively disclosing information, decisions, processes and data. Transparency, including about assumptions and uncertainty, can reduce the scope for rumours and falsehoods to take root and enable public scrutiny.
- 2. Inclusiveness:** Aim to reach all groups in society with information that is relevant and easily understood, with messages and channels tailored for diverse audiences, with respect for cultural and linguistic differences and paying attention to reaching disengaged, vulnerable, under-represented or marginalised groups. Develop interventions and communications around the needs and concerns of citizens. Responsive approaches facilitate two-way dialogue and enable an avenue for public participation in policy decisions.
- 3. Whole-of-society collaboration:** Efforts to counteract disinformation and misinformation should take a whole-of-society approach, in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders including the media, private sector, civil society, academia and individuals. This approach helps to build trust across society and promote the public's resilience to mis- and disinformation, as well as an environment conducive to constructive public engagement.
- 4. Public interest-driven:** Strive to be independent of politicisation when implementing interventions to counteract mis- and disinformation and introduce measures to ensure clear authorship, impartiality, accountability and objectivity.
- 5. Institutionalisation:** Consolidate interventions into coherent approaches guided by official communication and data policies, standards and guidelines.
- 6. Evidence-based:** Design and inform interventions with trustworthy and reliable data, testing and insights, and recognising emerging narratives, behaviours and characteristics.
- 7. Timeliness:** Act in a timely manner by identifying and responding to emerging narratives, recognising the speed at which false information can travel. Build preparedness and rapid responses by establishing coordination and approval mechanisms to intervene quickly with accurate, relevant and compelling content.
- 8. Prevention:** Pre-empt rumours, falsehoods and conspiracies to stop potentially harmful information from gaining traction. A focus on prevention requires governments to identify, monitor and track problematic content and its sources; recognise and proactively fill information and data gaps to reduce susceptibility to speculation and rumours; understand and anticipate vulnerabilities, risks and common disinformation tactics; and identify appropriate responses, such as 'pre-bunking'.
- 9. Future-proof:** Use innovative research and strategic foresight to anticipate the evolution of technology and information ecosystems and prepare for likely threats. Design counter-misinformation interventions as open, adaptable and matched with efforts to build capacities to respond to evolving challenges.

Adapted and summarised from: OECD, 2023 [17].

3.4. Communication strategies

Strategic communication strategies² tend to be either ‘proactive’, in advance of a likely disinformation risk, or ‘reactive’, guided by an observed risk, depending on the data and analysis gained from monitoring activities. Both these approaches should be tailored to different audiences.

Proactive strategies push back on false or misleading information before it becomes widespread, aiming to ‘pre-bunk’, raise awareness, and shape the information environment to minimise potential risks.

Reactive strategies counteract a potentially harmful message, narrative, actor, or objective, aiming to debunk, counter, and restore the information environment.

The *Debunking Handbook* contains a useful flowchart to help determine when and how to tackle misinformation [19,20] (see Figure 1 below).


BOX 8: CORRECTING INACCURATE INFORMATION ON ANIMAL HEALTH

The United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) runs a ‘media blog’. In addition to talking about the Department’s work, it is used ‘to set the record straight where one or more Defra Group organisations have been misquoted or misrepresented’.

It illustrates how a government agency regularly gives updates on sensitive issues like [badger culling](#), including rebuttals of media and other coverage.

Source: DEFRA, 2024 [18]

FIGURE 1.
A flowchart to determine when and how to tackle misinformation
Source: Lewandowsky S. *et al.*, 2020 [19])



2. Further details on many actions here are included in the [RESIST 2 Counter Disinformation Toolkit](#) [8].

3.4.1. Inoculation and pre-bunking

Building on a health metaphor, ‘inoculation’ is an anticipatory and preventative strategy designed to counteract (pre-bunk) false messages before they are widely spread. It typically aims to fill risky ‘information voids’ in advance of any disinformation and misinformation developing and taking hold. Such activities prepare audiences early, providing facts and information that help them develop some resistance – and cognitive resilience – that they can use to better deal with potentially damaging messages.



The core of this approach is clear, balanced, transparent and informative messaging, using facts and scientific evidence to explain complex issues. It is not supposed to advocate or persuade, only to inform and build trust – also being open about uncertainties, gaps and questions in the evidence.

3.4.2. Awareness-raising and campaigns

While inoculation and pre-bunking aim to present facts and evidence, awareness-raising activities and campaigns aim to shape public debate about issues likely to attract misinformation and disinformation. Such campaigns seek to nudge, advocate, influence and persuade target groups to adopt desired behaviours. Beyond providing information, campaigns are normally outcome-oriented, comprising planned communications, interactions and compelling narratives to produce a measurable outcome, such as behaviour change.

3.4.3. Networks and alliances

Where many actors are involved or impacted by disinformation, or where the necessary expertise is not available from a single organisation, networks and alliances can be created to jointly shape and deliver effective responses over time. Such collaboration between Veterinary Services, Aquatic Animal Health Services and Law Enforcement agencies – and others – is often critical to deal with disinformation or misinformation that, for example, poses legal as well as scientific challenges.

Alliances and networks offer collaborative and safe spaces for organisations to tackle the different dimensions of disinformation. This not only applies to responses but also to monitoring and preparation in which the different reach and expertise of each organisation contributes to the whole approach.

3.4.4. Counter-branding

Where the source and motivations of disinformation or misinformation are known, they can be exposed, and their credibility and reputation undermined. The aim is to inform audiences about the real motivations and interests of the people propagating false information, so their messages are weakened and their ‘brands’ are undermined.



Counter-branding techniques include exposing and clearly contrasting contradictions in the values, identity, interests and behaviour of the sources of false and misleading narratives. They employ smart and ‘viral’ communication products against the targets, and mobilise collaborators and partners to work together against such disinformation sources.

3.4.5. Resilience-building

A widely used approach is for governments and other organisations to empower and strengthen the capacities – and resilience – of people and communities to effectively recognise and deal with disinformation and misinformation. This approach typically develops and promotes targeted communications, education and training, for media, scientists, educators, health workers and indeed any concerned citizen.³ The idea is that better-informed and prepared individuals will look more critically at the information around them, calling out disinformation and misinformation, and taking responsibility for what they share.


3.4.5. Debunking and fact-checking

A core approach for disinformation and misinformation circulating on key issues and assessed as a significant risk to the animal health sector is to challenge and correct the false information.

A commonly used approach recommended in *The Debunking Handbook* [19] and used in the health and climate change domains and by journalists is dubbed the ‘truth sandwich’ [21] (see Figure 2 below).



FIGURE 2.
The debunking approach known as the ‘truth sandwich’
(Source: Lewandowsky *et al.*, 2020 [19])



3. A few of many examples include: [resources](#) and [video](#) from the Union of Concerned Scientists and; the [Journalist Field Guide: Navigating Climate Misinformation](#); as well as [resources](#) from the Government of Canada.

Such fact checking – and correcting – and debunking can be time-consuming, and are usually applied to each disinformation or misinformation message or event each time it is shared. Thus, there are advantages to building alliances in which partners collaborate to share the load and amplify the impact of this counter-messaging.

Potential partners include media organisations, many of whom support ‘fact-checking’ groups who seek and refute ‘fake news’ disinformation and misinformation and use their channels and reach to provide correct evidence and facts. These include AFP [22], the BBC [23], Reuters [24] and many others.

BOX 9: MEDIA FACT-CHECKING

Examples of fact-checking corrective stories published by AFP and Reuters to illustrate debunking action against disinformation:

- [Bill Gates did not say he wants to ‘vaccinate animals to give them better genetics’](#) [25]
- [Death of Kansas cattle in June 2022 caused by extreme temperatures, officials and industry say](#) [26]
- [Monkeypox is not the same disease as leprosy](#) [27]
- [Australian farmers not ‘forced to inject livestock with deadly mRNA vaccines’](#) [28]
- [False posts tout unregistered milk product as ‘golden cure for stomach diseases’](#) [29]
- [Thai posts falsely warn cattle disease has ‘spread to pigs’](#) [30]

4. Tools, methods and strategies to tackle disinformation and misinformation

PREPARE  Tools, methods and strategies to prepare responses to threats	DETECT  Tools, methods and strategies to detect, predict and listen for threats	RESPOND  Tools, methods and strategies to counter threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve expertise in social media strategies. • Build communication networks. • Use simulation exercises to learn and prepare. • Raise awareness of the impact of disinformation for animal health. • Raise and reinforce community awareness of trusted sources. • Provide specialist training to cover knowledge gaps. • Engage and train influencers to deliver the right messages. • Build multidisciplinary collaboration to deliver consistent messages. • Build trust for effective communication during emergencies. • Build relationships and collaboration between stakeholders to counteract misinformation and reinforce collective trust. • Ensure officials are aware of the need for rapid and timely responses. • Have plans and standard operating procedures in place. • Convene scenario exercises for external messaging and preparation with the media. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor media to identify potential disinformation and misinformation threats. • Monitor and listen to social media for trends. • Monitor the channels where disinformation and misinformation are spreading (social media and real world). • Develop indicators and algorithms to detect trends. • Use artificial intelligence to predict possible disinformation and misinformation triggers and scenarios. • Visit fringe channels of known conspiracy groups or disruptors. • Establish a reporting system for unusual/suspected health events. • Engage informal networks to hear local concerns. • Involve citizen science to report status during emergencies. • Improvise and be flexible and innovative – accurate prediction is not an exact science. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-bunk likely risks. • Communicate quickly to reduce the spread of disinformation and misinformation. • Communicate through blogs, interviews, workshops with big industry players, consultations and targeted short messaging. • Have information always ready and communication channels open. • Share short videos of the facts (myth busting), visuals, etc. • Use different social media outlets tailored to audiences. • Support and partner with credible fact-checking services. • Use social behaviour to reach target groups more effectively. • Practise and communicate evidence-based science. • Debunk incorrect information. • Engage private veterinarians and other trusted community members. • Engage influencers on social media to help spread messages. • Work with respected influencers to broadcast myth-busting messages.
Cross-cutting actions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build lasting relationships with civil society and community leaders. Avoid coming in and out only when there is an emergency. • Involve trusted community actors who can often detect rumours, disinformation and misinformation and share accurate information. • Support a One Health response that integrates Public Health, Environmental Health, Veterinary Services, Aquatic Animal Health Services and Law Enforcement to tackle these issues together. • Continuously identify lessons and apply improvement measures. 		

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Further resources

- Exercises to evaluate program plans, procedures and capabilities. US Department of Homeland Security [Internet] 2023 September 7. Available at: <https://www.ready.gov/exercises> (accessed on 12 April 2024).
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